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Economists and other social scientists have long tried to understand the nature of poverty 
and how poor people make decisions. T.W. Schultz, a Nobel Laureate, former professor 
of economics at the University of Chicago, and former president of the American 
Economic Association, spent his career working in development and agricultural 
economics. In his 1980 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Schultz suggests that there is 
some accounting for the behavior of the poor in agriculture. “Farmers, the world over, in 
dealing with costs, returns, and risks are calculating economic agents. Within their small, 
individual, allocative domain they are fine-tuning entrepreneurs, tuning so subtly that 
many experts fail to recognize how efficient they are,” (Schultz 1980, p. 644).  
Accounting for the Poor 
The notion of “accounting for the poor,” as in the title of this paper, refers to a number of 
aspects of measurement. The first involves the millions of poor people in the world and 
their contributions to the economy. In many economies, when added up, the contributions 
of poor populations are a substantial part of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Thus, one 
has to account for them. There is a countervailing view, though, that while there may be 
many poor people, they do not really contribute much in terms of value-added, and the 
larger source of economic activity is from manufacturing and industrialization. This turns 
out to be a false assumption, and we do need to take the poor into account. The second 
meaning of the title is literal: Creating financial accounts for the poor, and doing it well. 
That is, to assemble an appropriate set of accounts of the poor. The third and final 
meaning of the title addresses concerns that economists are not able to account for the 
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behavior of the poor, as if poor people follow some alternative norms or are not 
maximizing. As Schultz suggests in the quote above, his view—and the view taken here 
—is the opposite: Namely, we can and should use standard economic theory in 
combination with data.  
Poor People Drive Growth and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
I now address each one of these meanings in more detail. First, the poor add up to big 
numbers. In Thailand, we can see the importance of small, proprietary income at the 
macroeconomic level. If we look at the fraction of their contributions to national income 
from 1970 through 2003, proprietary income was the single largest component until only 
recently (figure 1). Proprietary income includes proprietors, such as farmers, who were 
particularly important earlier in Thailand’s history. But another piece is non-farm 
proprietary income, the so-called “small” people who run small or medium enterprises. 
No individual business amounts to much, but when one adds them all up formally, it 
turns out to comprise a large portion of GDP. The pieces of national income that are 
traditionally or stereotypically thought to be important, in contrast, make up a smaller 
portion of national income. Wage and salary income became important only within the 
last decade in Thailand, and corporate profits—the “big” firms—made up very little. This 
analysis for Thailand is typical of data in developing countries.  
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Insert Figure 1 here 
If we look at TFP, a metric commonly used by macroeconomists to measure 
productivity, or the contribution to GDP beyond factor inputs, we can compare simulated 
output from a model that takes a stand on small business with the Solow residuals from 
actual, aggregated data (Jeong and Townsend 2007). Specifically, TFP is simulated using 
a model estimated on micro data, which allows individuals to choose their most 
productive occupations, something that is facilitated by an expanding financial 
infrastructure. If one puts estimated parameters and the expanding financial infrastructure 
into the model, one can simulate and track about 78 percent of growth in TFP between 
1970 and 1995 (figure 2).  Thus, to summarize, from a macroeconomic standpoint—
TFP—the innovation and growth in Thailand derives from relatively poor people making 
these occupation transitions. While they may seem trivial on a small scale, we see their 
impact nationally in both GDP and TFP. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
The Poor and Financial Accounting: Households as Corporate Firms 
To “account for the poor,” in the sense of creating the financial accounts, requires 
adequate data. The primary data used here is from a project I lead, which has gathered 
data in Thailand for more than 15 years. An annual survey in both rural and urban areas 
contains a sample of more than 3,000 households scattered across 200 villages, towns, 
and even city neighborhoods. A complementary monthly survey, ongoing for more than 
180 months, is fielded for more than 700 households across a subset of 16 villages. The 
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questionnaires for these surveys are quite detailed, which makes the idea of accounting 
for the poor a reality.  
Households, including the poor households engaged in agricultural work 
described by Schultz, can be thought of as businesses through the lens of formal 
corporate financial accounting. We can then apply the same concepts that economists use 
to study performance and liquidity for medium and large corporate firms. As Angus 
Deaton indicates, “The only way to obtain … [these] measures is by imposing an 
accounting framework on the data, and painstakingly constructing estimates from myriad 
responses to questions about the specific components that contribute to the total” (Deaton 
1997, p. 29).  While creating such accounts is a tedious exercise, it is really the only way 
to understand how all of the individual responses add up to the line items needed in the 
accounts, at both the individual and larger, aggregated level.  
Thus, using the monthly data, we have created the income statement, balance 
sheet, and statement of cash flow for hundreds of households, over 150 months 
(Samphantharak and Townsend 2009). With these accounts, one can look at both 
liquidity and asset management. In any month, a household has consumption expenses, 
investment expenses, and income. If consumption and investment are larger than income, 
the difference is a deficit, D,  (often the result of seasonal variation) and the household 
must “finance” the deficit somehow, by using the stock of cash they have, drawing down 
savings accounts, borrowing, or receiving gifts and transfers from other households. The 
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sum of these “financing mechanisms,” the F’s, seen in the accounts add up to the total 
deficit, as follows: 
ሺ1aሻ											ܦ	 ൌ 	ܨଵ 	൅	ܨଶ 	൅	…	൅	ܨ௡ 
Likewise, surplus is saved via various mechanisms. One can also do a   
variance/co-variance decomposition and quantify which objects are used the most and 
which are used the least.    
ሺ1bሻ										1 ൌ ܥ݋ݒሺܦ, ܨଵሻܸܽݎሺܦሻ ൅
ܥ݋ݒሺܦ, ܨଶሻ
ܸܽݎሺܦሻ ൅ ⋯൅
ܥ݋ݒሺܦ, ܨ௡ሻ
ܸܽݎሺܦሻ  
The accounts can also differentiate issues of smoothing and liquidity from rates of 
return. When a firm goes bankrupt, there is always the question of whether the firm 
mismanaged its liquidity or whether it went bankrupt because it was not productive. This 
difference can be explored only if one is able to distinguish liquidity, using cash flow 
from rates of return, the latter using an accrual notion of income.  
Financial accounts help make asset management clear. Net savings on the accrued 
income statement plus gifts mean a household’s wealth will increase, and net worth will 
also increase. A mechanical relationship links the income statement (a flow) to the 
balance sheet (a picture of the assets and the liabilities at one point in time), so we can 
actually see portfolio management. 
Household Wealth Accumulation and Net Worth  
6 
 
With these measurements in place, we can explore changes in household net worth over 
time, stratifying initially by where each household is in the cross-section. The results are 
surprising. While we might expect to see relatively poor households with few assets and 
low net worth, households in the lowest quartile have a growth in net worth of 22 percent 
per year (Pawasutipaisit and Townsend 2011, table 1). Alternatively, growth in net worth 
for the highest quartile, those with the most assets initially, is just 1 percent per year. 
Though an emerging market with GDP growth of 4 to 5 percent per year, these 
measurements bring out the creation of wealth at the individual level, and the fact that it 
is heterogeneous. That is, wealth growth is quite strong for the asset-poor in the sample 
and high relative to other, richer households.  
Insert Table 1 here 
Growth in net worth is a combination of savings rate, productivity, and assets 
level. Using the following equation, overall savings, S, is equal to the savings rate (as a 
fraction of income) times the return on assets (ROA), scaled by the initial level of assets, 
A. That is, for each household i: 
ሺ2aሻ										ܵ௧௜ ൌ 	 ௌ೟
೔
గ೟೔
గ೟೔
஺೟೔
ܣ௧௜ . 
If this expression for savings is substituted into the growth of net worth and 
divided by the initial net worth, we see that the proportional growth of net worth 
(controlling for gifts, G) has to do, clearly, with the savings rates and return on assets: 
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Indeed, in the data there are correlations between the growth of net worth and 
savings rates, typically positive and significant, particularly if one averages up not only 
for a given household over all the months but also over the years of the survey. This 
confirms and quantifies the theory that savings rates do matter, and savings rates are 
contributing to the growth of net worth for Thai households. Even more obvious in the 
data, though, is the correlation between the growth of net worth and the return on assets. 
By any measure (province, month, year, whole sample averages, etc.), these correlations 
are always substantial—50, 60, 70 percent for the most part—and statistically significant.  
Thus, a large source of increasing wealth is due to how households are deploying 
their assets, and many of the poor are doing this quite well, in the sense of getting a high 
rate of return on their existing assets. There is something intrinsic to the household; that 
is, some households are simply more productive than other households. Whatever the 
reason, it is persistent. If we look at the relationship between ROA in the first half of the 
sample and in the second half of the sample, we see that household data points lie very 
close to the 45 degree line, indicating a near-exact relationship over time. 
  Looking more closely at the households in the upper quartile with a high ROA, 
we see that they are investing in their businesses and their farms. This supports the earlier 
point about economic theory and behavior: These households are very self-aware that 
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their wealth is increasing as a result of their productive enterprises and are acting in ways 
that reflect this knowledge. Of course, there are households with lower rates of return but 
who still have an increase in net worth. The behavior of these households is different. 
They are not investing in household enterprises, but rather accumulating savings through 
either cash savings at home or deposits in a bank. This is, of course, a wise decision if the 
rate of return on a business is not all that great. 
It is worth noting that within Thailand, there is variation in ROA and the growth 
of net worth among provinces. In Buriram, one of the northeastern provinces, the 
correlation between ROA in the first half of the sample and the second half of the sample 
is lower. When we looked more closely at what these households are doing, we found 
that this was an area in which the landscape was literally being transformed by 
urbanization. What had previously been separate villages had agglomerated into one town 
and urbanized. These households were also changing occupations over the period, and the 
data show they did so to achieve higher rates of return. The underlying story though is, 
again, one of maximization and self-aware, rational behavior. 
If we pool together individual households, we can think more broadly and over a 
longer term about the whole life cycle. This allows us to explore how households are 
thinking about their situation as they age and what they are doing. Although we have 
been able to track households in the Thai data for 15 years, obviously this does not 
represent a household’s entire lifetime; households vary in age. Thus, we piece together 
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these individual 15-year accounts, averaging across households of a given age, to plot 
consumption, income, and savings over a typical life cycle.  
Here again, we see disparities among regions. For example, in the central region, 
near Bangkok, average income is consistently above consumption and net savings is 
positive, i.e., net worth is increasing (figure 3). This illustrates a classic picture of the life 
cycle where net worth starts lower, as one is young and just starting a career, and 
increases to a peak at about 60 years of age. As one ages, productivity drops; 
consumption is then at the level of income or even exceeding it, and the household begins 
running down its wealth.  In contrast, in the northeastern region, an area that remains 
predominantly involved in agricultural production, average consumption is consistently 
above income, and net savings is negative across all ages (figure 4). These households are 
reliant on incoming gifts and remittances. The net result is that net wealth increases over 
time as the number and amount of gifts received increases by age. While this does not 
look like a standard life cycle diagram, it exposes an alternate strategy. Namely, within 
the same household, we see overlapping generations: Aging parents and children who are 
now farming or have migrated to Bangkok and are sending gifts back. The economy is 
growing and net wealth is going up, so there is not a need to run down assets from 
financial savings. The contrast is interesting, but in both cases there is no evidence that 
these households, on average, are making mistakes.  
10 
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
Insert Figure 4 here 
Risk Sharing & Village Networks 
I return to T.W. Schultz and his thoughts on how economic theory can—and should— be 
applied to development. “This branch of economics has suffered from several intellectual 
mistakes. The major mistake has been the presumption that standard economic theory is 
inadequate for understanding low-income countries, and that a separate economic theory 
is needed… Fortunately, the intellectual tide has begun to turn. Increasing numbers of 
economists have come to realize that standard economic theory is just as applicable to the 
scarcity problems that confront low-income countries as to the corresponding problems 
of high-income countries,” Schultz suggests (1980, p. 640).   
Not only can one think about individual behavior relative to economic theory, it is 
also possible to think about the behavior of entire communities. Work in India from a 
study on risk and insurance (Townsend 1994) shows the fluctuations in income across 
time. I often refer to this as the Rocky Mountain graph, in that the peaks in income 
almost conceal the valleys that lie behind it. For a village in India over the period 1976 to 
1984, we see that fluctuations in income are quite erratic, with few aggregate shocks 
visible (figure 5). Alternatively, the consumption diagram is akin to Kansas, remarkably 
flat over time (figure 6). Within this community, the households who are fortunate 
enough to have high income are sharing risk with and lending these resources to the less 
fortunate households.  
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Insert Figure 5 here 
Insert Figure 6 here 
The risk sharing seen in the graph of consumption does not imply that there exists 
an egalitarian society where everyone has the same level of consumption. In fact, what is 
not visible here is the presence of a small tilt in the consumption diagram. A household’s 
consumption is stabilized around its own mean. Some households have lower means than 
others, but everyone is a beneficiary of some kind of communal level smoothing, almost 
as if the village had Arrow-Debreu complete securities (with the traditional trading of 
assets substituted for other village risk-sharing mechanisms). This can be thought of as a 
risk-sharing benchmark. Consumption should move in the presence of an aggregate 
shock, and the aggregate risk should be shared. After controlling for this aggregate, 
idiosyncratic income shocks should be shared as well though they will dissipate to zero 
when pooled. Thus, after controlling for aggregate shocks, household consumption 
should not move at all with household-specific income. The risk-sharing equation below 
fro the growth of household consumption explores this relationship.  
ሺ3ሻ											ቆ݈݊൫ܿ௧
௜൯ െ ݈݊ሺ ܿఛ௜ሻ
ݐ െ 	߬ ቇ ൌ ߚ ቆ
݈݊൫ܿ௧௚൯ െ ݈݊൫ܿఛ௚൯
ݐ െ ߬ ቇ ൅ ߛ ቆ
݈݊൫ݕ௧௜൯ െ ݈݊	ሺݕఛ௜ሻ
ݐ െ ߬ ቇ ൅ ߝ௧,ఛ
௜,௚ 
In this example, β, the coefficient on the growth of aggregate consumption, is 
determined to be close to one, and γ, the coefficient on the growth of idiosyncratic 
income, is not zero as it should be but it is very close to zero. The benchmark standard 
does quite well.   
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The exact mechanisms of risk sharing at the village level can be better understood 
using the Thai data, which displays similar Rocky Mountain and Kansas pictures. As a 
starting point, a census prior to the start of the monthly data provided a map of 
households who are related by blood or marriage. Then detailed transaction data collected 
in subsequent monthly surveys can be used to map active networks that illustrate the 
interconnectedness of households in financial transactions, including gifts and loans. The 
two maps in figures 7 and 8 show that a large number of households are connected, either 
related to each other or conducting financial transactions with one another (or both).  
Insert Figure 7 here 
Insert figure 8 here 
 
Now we return to the benchmark risk-sharing regressions, to compare the 
sensitivity of consumption to income. We can determine whether the effect of income is 
mitigated by being in a network of financial transactions among households or by having 
family in the village. For consumption smoothing, research suggests that participation in 
a financial network via gifts and loans is quite helpful.  In terms of smoothing cash flow 
to protect investment, having kin within the village (or nearby) is beneficial (Kinnan and 
Townsend 2012). 
In interviews, the households themselves articulate an awareness of lending and 
borrowing networks. The data also shows clearly the transactions; the shadow money 
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market is quite visible in the data. One can see when loans are due and observe 
borrowing and lending transactions among households with a 12-month seasonal pattern. 
Both rise and fall together. The point is that many households are borrowing to repay 
loans or taking out bridge loans. For example, if a household has a long-term loan due, 
perhaps from a formal sector lender, and the household is having a low-income year, it 
borrows in the village money market from friends or relatives. Now the household has a 
short-term loan that can be used to pay off the long-term loan. The cycle continues: The 
household’s credit is still good, and it can borrow again from the source of the prior long-
term loan and use these funds to pay off the short-term loan. We thus see millions of 
baht, or hundreds of thousands of dollars, circulating in the village money market.  
The benchmark standard described can also be used to measure how well villages 
as a whole are doing in terms of labor supply. Though labor supply may be thought of as 
an individual, if not a household, response to try to earn money to compensate for having 
a bad year in agriculture or business, this does not account for networks. Labor supply in 
Thai villages is more akin to leisure sharing or co-working, where labor exchanges are 
common (Bonhomme et al. 2012). In villages in the northeast, for example, individuals 
will work on someone else’s plot and then the individual will reciprocate. Money does 
not change hands, so individuals are basically exchanging labor. What the data show is 
that when one group of households is working hard, it is likely all of the households are 
working hard. Groups of households are sharing the burden, just like they were sharing 
consumption. Individuals respond as they should to wages. But the effect of idiosyncratic 
income, or non-wage income, is mitigated so that the net effect on these households’ 
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shock is small; the participation margin change for a one standard deviation shock in non-
wage income is less than 5 percent, and the sensitivity of hours to non-wage income is 
smaller.  
  Another consideration is the rate of return on assets, not just at the individual 
level but also at the community level. In the capital asset pricing model, a standard 
financial model, project investments that have returns that co- move with the market are 
less valuable projects because an individual cannot hedge with them; thus, they require a 
higher expected return.   
The diagrams in figure 9 illustrate the correlation between β, the correlation of 
household rates of return with village averages of return, and the expected return on 
assets.  Informal village economies rival the U.S. and perhaps even do better than what 
individuals can do via formal financial markets.  
Insert figure 9 here 
Of course, village networks are not perfect. Figure 10 shows the marginal product 
of capital versus the interest rate, and indicates that the marginal product of capital varies 
inversely with the level of wealth (Pawasutipaisit and Townsend 2011).  As discussed 
earlier, households with the lowest wealth have high rates of return (measured in this case 
through the estimation of a production function as the marginal product of capital), and 
relatively well-off households have low rates of return. In principle, if markets were 
perfect, the benchmark standard would suggest that the marginal product of capital 
should be equalized across the households, after adjusting for risk. It is clear that this is 
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not the case, so in this respect, at least, these village money markets do not work nearly 
so well.  
Insert figure 10 here 
Figure 11 shows what is predicted about the relationship between rates of return 
and assets through the lens of models with explicit obstacles to trade (Karaivanov and 
Townsend 2012).   
Insert figure 11 here 
To elaborate, there can be good reasons why one would not expect to see the 
financing of investment. When there is moral hazard, full insurance is problematic. If an 
individual knows his consumption is going to be protected against fluctuations in income 
by his friends and relatives, there would be less incentive to work hard. The expectation 
of a bailout is present.  With that in mind, the individual has to take on more risk and may 
limit investment. Or, again in terms of financing investment, to the extent that an 
individual could deny repayment, that kind of limited commitment would reduce loans 
and move an individual to something closer to self-financing. 
Karaivanov and Townsend (2012) find, again, that in urban areas, the 
combination of data (consumption, income, investment, and capital stock) shows that the 
weight of the evidence is toward a moral hazard regime. In the village-level data, even 
when using both consumption and investment data, a savings-only or very limited 
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financial regime fits best, as good sharing in consumption is outweighed by poor 
investment; that is, money is not flowing to the more productive households.  
Implications for Policy 
In Transforming Traditional Agriculture, Schultz (1964) illustrates how farmers in poor 
countries maximize the return from their resources, acting rationally in response to 
government policy. Governments in these countries often artificially set low prices on 
crops and tax farmers heavily; in response, farmers were less likely to innovate.  Indeed, 
this is a theme across several of Schultz’s books: Rural poverty persists in poor countries 
because government policy in those countries favors urban dwellers.   
In Thailand, this also rings true. Policy often emanates out of Bangkok, and 
people who live in the capital sometimes have a view that poor people in rural areas need 
handouts, at best. There is a general lack of awareness of the successful strategies that 
poor households are adopting and the subsequent increases in their net worth. This 
represents another obstacle, and in Schultz’s mind, is quite an important one.  
If we looked at Thailand in terms of the evolution of the financial system, both 
commercial banks and the government bank, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC), are expanding over time, especially so for the government bank 
and somewhat less so for the commercial banks (Assuncao, Mityakov and Townsend 
2012). Figure 12 shows BAAC and commercial bank expansion over time, from 1986 to 
1996. Though both have increased, BAAC has moved relatively more out of Bangkok 
and the Central area. 
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Insert figure 12 here. 
Even this level of aggregation conceals what is happening at the local level. In the 
patterns mapped out in figure 13, a stylized map in which the dots represent villages and 
the numbers represent per capita income. If banks were profit-maximizing, we would 
anticipate them moving to high-income areas to mobilize savings and make loans. 
However, the BAAC has a different mandate given the altruistic nature of its charter. The 
diagrams show how the banks enter markets sequentially, over time. We see the 
commercial banks end up in very well-connected, high-income areas, and the BAAC 
branches end up on the periphery.  
While this may seem like an appropriate strategy, given that the government 
created the BAAC to service the poor and commercial banks are generating profits in the 
high-income areas. We have been modeling this, but that model at estimated parameters 
tells a different story. Overall, location decisions and strategies have created a distortion. 
Even if the BAAC is interested in overall financial access, and it weights the services 
being provided by the commercial banks the same as its own services, the banks are 
going to play a Nash Equilibrium in terms of where to locate, without commitment to 
future expansion paths. That is, the government bank cannot announce in advance the 
path that it is going to follow, and instead it reacts to what commercial banks are doing. 
Likewise, commercial banks are going to anticipate where the BAAC is going to go. 
Collectively, these decisions generate the observed pattern of bank location. Politically, it 
looks successful, in the sense that farmers are getting serviced by government banks. 
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However, in fact, the arrangement is not Pareto optimal. Low wealth households in newly 
urbanizing areas are under-served. 
Insert figure 13 here 
I take this as an example of what Schultz had in mind. It is not that the urban 
residents and the Thai government are ignoring poor people, but rather they have created 
this populist program that brings some distortions and is not helping as much as it could. 
Schultz studied Germany and Japan in the period post-World War II and was amazed at 
how quickly these countries recovered, concluding that a healthy and highly educated 
population drove growth (Schultz 1964). This was part of his work on the concept of 
human capital for which he is so well known.  
Of course, it was not that the government could not intervene; the idea was that 
the government can help people, but it needs to help people to help themselves. 
Education and health are ways to keep people strong and productive, and Schultz 
considered that to be a big part of growth.  
  
To summarize, we see that the poor make up a significant part of the economy, 
often innovating and even driving TFP growth.  They can be viewed through the lens of 
corporate financial accounts and better understood through economic theory, not just as 
individuals one at a time but also as entire urban communities and villages. The 
environment is not perfect for poor populations. There are obstacles to trade, especially 
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for investment, and obstacles created by the regulatory political economic financial 
infrastructure Poor populations should be given every opportunity to integrate financially 
into the rest of the economy, and to manage their money accordingly. This would result 
in improvements in human capital,     wealth and net worth, and overall well-being.   
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Figure 1. Distribution of national income in Thailand, 1970 – 2003 
  
Thailand: Distribution of National Income (1970-2003p)
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Table 1. Growth of Net Worth by the Initial Wealth Distribution (%) 
Source: Pawasutipaisit and Townsend (2011). 
 
Initial Wealth 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
Growth of Wealth 21.9735 5.2500 3.1597 0.0984 
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Figure 3. Flows (average income, savings, consumption, and gifts) and stocks (net 
assets financed by savings and other means) in Thailand, central region. 
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Figure 4. Flows (average income, savings, consumption, and gifts) and stocks (net 
assets financed by savings and other means) in Thailand, northeast region 
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Figure 8. Kinship relationships in a Thai village, Sisaket province 
Source: Samphantharak  and Townsend (2009), figure 6.1(b) 
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Figure 9. Network as market in Thailand 
Remarks: Horizontal Axis = Beta; Vertical Axis = Expected Return. Each graph 
represents each of the networks. We treat each network as the market. From left to right 
and from top to bottom are networks from Lopburi (Networks 49A and 49B), Buriram 
(27A), and Sisaket (53A, 53B, and 53C).  
  
 Figur
inter
Sourc
 
e 10. Marg
est rate. 
e: Pawasuti
inal produc
paisit and T
t of capital
ownsend (20
 
32 
 as a functi
11), figure
on of capita
14. 
l, compare
 
d to average 
 Figur
 
e 11. Model findings – savings on
 
33 
ly (rural) a
 
nd moral h
 
azard (urban) 
 Figure 12. BAAC and commercial ban
34 
k Expansion in Thailand, 1986 - 1996 
 
 Figur
Note
 
 
e 13. Simu
: Commercia
lation of ga
l bank (red)
me for com
 x BAAC (g
35 
mercial ban
reen) 
ks and BAAC  
 
 
